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A Modest Experiment in Pedagogy: 
Lessons on Comparative Constitutional Law 
Thomas E. Baker* 
Abstract: This article has been revised from a paper I presented 
and submitted to the International Association of Law Schools Confe-
rence on Comparative Constitutional Law, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 
11-12, 2009) hosted by the American University Washington College 
of Law and the Georgetown University Law Center.  That invitational 
conference — I was invited as one of the representatives of the United 
States — brought together an amazing array of leading constitutional-
ists from all over the world.  This article describes how I have inte-
grated comparative and international law lessons into my basic, first 
year course on U.S. Constitutional Law.  This version of the paper 
reflects my experience at that Conference and the comments of the 
other participants.  I have also added citations and quotations to the 
relevant papers of other conference participants to make this version 
of the paper all the more thoughtful and helpful.  The article includes: 
a brief review of the secondary literature on teaching comparative 
constitutional law; a bibliography of comparative constitutional law 
books; a basic pedagogical theory; some practical advice and recom-
mendations; and a set of four lessons on the themes of judicial review, 
transnational interpretation, affirmative action, and reproductive 
rights, complete with discussion questions and a list of readings. 
* * * 
                                                                                                                           
 * Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law, Miami, Florida 
(http://law.fiu.edu/; thomas.baker@fiu.edu).  This article was originally written and submitted to 
the International Association of Law Schools Conference on Comparative Constitutional Law, 
Washington, D.C. (Sept. 11-12, 2009), http://www.ialsnet.org/meetings/constit/papers/ 
BakerThomas(USA).pdf, hosted by the American University Washington College of Law and 
the Georgetown University Law Center, http://www.ialsnet.org/meetings/constit/papers/ 
MasterBookletConLaw.pdf.  The author is grateful for the thoughtful reactions of his fellow 
conferees.  An evolved version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the World 
Institute for Research and Publication — Constitutional Law (May 14-16, 2010), 
http://www.wirp.org/law.  The author likewise is grateful to Professor Allesandra Rinaldi, Gen-
eral Secretary of the Institute, and to our fellow online conferees for their thoughtful audience 
reactions. 
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In 2002, when I joined the founding faculty at the Florida Inter-
national University College of Law, I had been teaching constitutional 
law for over two decades.  I prided myself on being an innovative 
teacher who was willing to try new and different approaches.1  Like 
many American law professors, however, I was agnostic about com-
parative and international law.  I had grown accustomed to teaching a 
traditional course, using a traditional casebook, following a traditional 
design albeit with the occasional filigree.2  My no-nonsense syllabus 
promised: 
Our course goal is to achieve the basic understanding of modern 
constitutional law that is necessary to be a successful law student, 
an able lawyer, and a good citizen.  The objects of our study are 
the Constitution and the Supreme Court.  This is a course in “con 
law for lawyers” — we will read, analyze, and argue about consti-
tutional law the way lawyers and judges do.3 
As its name suggests, the University I joined was originally char-
tered to promote international understanding.4  Its stated mission is to 
be “an urban, multi-campus, research university serving South Flori-
da, the state, the nation and the international community [that] im-
part[s] knowledge through excellent teaching, promoting public ser-
vice, discovering new knowledge, solving problems through research, 
and fostering creativity.”5  FIU has long been committed to the idea of 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, A Law Student's Responsibility for a Liberal Education, 20 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1153 (1989); Thomas E. Baker & James E. Viator, Not Another Constitu-
tional Law Course: A Proposal to Teach a Course on the Constitution, 76 IOWA L. REV. 739 
(1991); Thomas E. Baker, Teaching a Course on the Constitution — Finding and Using Founding 
Documents; Casebook and Supplement; Internet Sites Can Make a Web-Based Course, Using 
Quizzes, Opinion Writing Assignment, in TEACHING THE LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM (Steven 
Friedland & Gerald F. Hess eds., 2004).  
 2 See generally Thomas E. Baker, Mastering Modern Constitutional Law, 21 SEATTLE 
U.L. REV. 927 (1998) (describing some of the filigrees I add to RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES (9th ed. 2009)). 
 3 The best single volume on designing a law school course is MICHAEL HUNTER 
SCHWARTZ, SOPHIE SPARROW & GERALD HESS, TEACHING LAW BY DESIGN (2009).  See 
Thomas E. Baker & Mary Olszewska, An Annotated Bibliography on Law Teaching, 18 PERSP.: 
TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 34 (2009). 
 4 FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY — MILLENNIUM STRATEGIC PLAN 12 (2002), 
http://www.fiu.edu/oir/docs/msp.pdf. The student body of the College of Law, in turn, is remark-
ably international.  A few years ago, a colleague took a census in his first year class of approx-
imately sixty students; he learned that they were born in twenty-five different countries (Argen-
tina, the Bahamas, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Haiti, Honduras, 
India, Italy, Iraq, Iran, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, Trini-
dad-Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia) and some of the countries on the list 
(e.g., Cuba) were the birthplace of multiple students.  Email from Andrew Jay McClurg to Tho-
mas E. Baker (Dec. 12, 2009) (on file with the author). 
 5 Florida International University Mission Statement, http://academic.fiu.edu/ prov-
ost_mission.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2011). 
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globalism and has achieved considerable distinction in the social 
sciences and the international realm, through its programs, centers, 
and institutes.6 
The College of Law is contributing to that institutional promi-
nence.7  We understand that our students will practice law in an in-
creasingly globalized professional reality — their “real world” will be 
the “entire world.”8  Our College’s mission statement provides, in 
part: 
The College of Law offers a curriculum that prepares students 
for ethical and effective practice of law in an increasingly global 
and multicultural world.  The curriculum includes a full and 
faithful presentation of the courses traditionally offered at nearly 
all U.S. law schools.  In addition, building on the parent universi-
ty’s distinction in its international programs, the curriculum in-
corporates important developments in the globalization of both 
public and private law.  The academic program takes a pervasive 
approach to international and comparative law, incorporating 
these perspectives into all domestic law classes, and includes a 
required introductory course and a rich array of upper level elec-
tives in international, transnational and comparative law.9  
We have kept each of these curricular promises.  First, we created a 
hybrid course that is unique in American legal education:  “Introduc-
tion to Comparative and International Law,” a three-hour required 
first-year course offered in the spring semester.10  Second, like most 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See generally MILLENNIUM STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 4, at 12-16. 
 7 Thomas E. Baker, Reflections on Law Schools and the Idea of the University, 1 FIU L. 
REV. 1 (2006). 
 8 See generally Japp Hage, Comparative Law and Legal Science (Maastricht European 
Private Law Institute, Working Paper No. 2011/11, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1600108; Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of Transnation-
al Law, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 65 (1996); Mark C. Rahdert, Comparative Constitutional Advocacy, 
56 AM. U. L. REV. 553 (2007); Laurel S. Terry, et al., Transnational Legal Practice, 43 INT’L 
LAWYER 943 (2009); John E. Sexton, Curricular Responses to Globalization, 20 PENN. ST. INT’L 
L. REV. 15, 17 (2001); Report Regarding the Pacific McGeorge Workshop on Globalizing the 
Law School Curriculum, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 267, 286-92 (2006).  
 9 FIU College of Law Faculty Bylaws, Part I. at 5 (Mar. 2, 2007). 
 10 The course catalogue description reads: 
Law 5259.  Introduction to International and Comparative Law.  This new course introduc-
es students to public international law, international economic law, and comparative law.  
Exposure to the law of nations in the international component of the course poses critical 
jurisprudential questions on the nature of law, the role of enforceability, and the prospects 
for constructing an international society.  The comparative component compares and con-
trasts the common law system that prevails in the United States to civil law systems, espe-
cially as they have evolved in Latin America.  Together the course provides the foundation 
for later advanced study in these and other topics as part of the upper level curriculum. 
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other American law schools, our curriculum presents a menu of ad-
vanced, elective courses in international and comparative law.11  
Third, the corporate faculty has committed to “globalizing, interna-
tionalizing, trans-nationalizing, and comparativizing” the legal educa-
tion we provide our students pervasively, i.e., in every course we 
teach.12  Our Faculty Bylaw on teaching explicitly requires: “Each fa-
culty member must be committed to excellence in fulfilling teaching 
responsibilities, and, consistent with the mission of the College of 
Law, devote a minimum of one class hour per course credit hour to 
coverage of relevant international and comparative law materials in 
their domestic law classes, except seminars.”13 
In the rest of this paper, I will explain how I meet this obligation 
in my first-year, first semester four-hour required course on constitu-
tional law.14  The general advice I would offer my reader would be to 
                                                                                                                           
CATALOGUE OF THE FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW 28 (2008-09).  
For an account of the curious conceptual origins of this course, which sprang from the imagina-
tion of our founding dean like Pallas Athena sprang from the forehead of Zeus, see generally 
Leonard P. Strickman, A New Law School: An International Curriculum, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 641, 
643-44 (2002). 
 11 A sample list of these courses includes: Admiralty Law; Caribbean Law and Develop-
ment; Comparative Business Law; Comparative Constitutional Law; Comparative Criminal 
Law; Comparative Environmental Law Urban Issues; Comparative Family Law; Comparative 
Law; Comparative Law: Constitutions and the Judicial Process; Comparative Perspectives on 
the Regulatory State; Conflict Management Practice-Comparative Perspective of Mediation; 
Conflict Management Practice-Comparative Perspectives of Negotiation; Conflict Prevention 
and Community Improvement; Conflicts of Law; Cross Cultural Communication in Internation-
al Dispute Resolution; Environmental Health Law and Policy; European Union Law; Foreign 
Relations and National Security Law; Immigration and Human Rights Clinic; Immigration Law; 
International and Comparative Sales; International Antitrust; International Banking; Interna-
tional Business Transactions; International Commercial Arbitration; International Criminal 
Law; International Environmental Law; International Human Rights Law; International Intel-
lectual Property Law; International Litigation; International Organizations; International Taxa-
tion; International Telecommunications Law; International Trade Law and Policy; Introduction 
to International and Comparative Law; Latin American Private Law; Law and Politics in Latin 
America; NAFTA and Other Regional Trade Agreements; Ocean and Coastal Law; Payment 
Systems; Profesión Jurídica Comparada (Comparative Legal Profession); Public International 
Law; Refugee and Asylum Law; and Transnational Commercial Law.  See FIU Law: Interna-
tional and Comparative Law, http://law.lawnet.fiu.edu/index.php?option=com_content&task= 
view&id=64&Itemid= 613 (last visited Apr. 13, 2011). 
 12 M.C. Mirow, Globalizing Property: Incorporating Comparative and International Law 
into First-Year Property, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 183, 186 (2004).  See Brian K. Landsberg 
(McGeorge School of Law, U.S.A.), The Use of International and Comparative Sources in a 
Domestic Constitutional Law Course, International Association of Law Schools Conference on 
Constitutional Law, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 11-14, 2009), http://www.ialsnet.org/meetings/ 
constit/papers/LandsbergBrian (USA).pdf (the coeditor of a global series of course supplements 
describes the “pervasive” approach). 
 13 FIU College of Law Faculty Bylaws, Part III. B (1) at 10 (Mar. 2, 2007). 
 14 The course description of the course provides: 
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repeat the same expert advice of others whom I have benefited from 
following.  First, my approach was “selective and modest” — a self-
consciously tentative attempt to expose my novice students to my own 
novice comparativist perspectives.15  After all, my students are 
enrolled in an introductory survey course on American constitutional 
law, not an advanced comparative law course, and I myself am not a 
comparativist.  Second, I sought to “identify practices or doctrines in 
other stable democracies that are different from those in the United 
States, and ask: They do things differently there.  What reasons might 
they have for adopting their practices or doctrines?  What reasons 
might there be that caution against our adopting those practices or 
doctrines?’”16  Finally, I set out to explore with my students some in-
teresting examples of a phenomenon Justice Breyer so aptly but obli-
quely once described: how and why “[j]udges in different countries 
increasingly apply somewhat similar legal phrases to somewhat similar 
circumstances.”17  These three recommendations have served me and 
my students very well. 
After consulting some of the excellent teaching resources availa-
ble,18 I developed four thematic “Lessons on Comparative Constitu-
                                                                                                                           
Law 5501.  Constitutional Law (4 credits): This course deals with the fundamental prin-
ciples of American constitutionalism.  It considers the relationships between the branches 
of the federal government within the separation of powers and the relationship of the na-
tional government with the states within our federalism.  It focuses on the institution of the 
Supreme Court and its power of judicial review and how that power is exercised to interp-
ret the Constitution.  The various powers of Congress are studied, especially the commerce 
clause power, including its negative effects on the state police power.  The executive pow-
ers of the President, both domestic and foreign, are explored.  The constitutional relation-
ship between the individual and the government is analyzed within the context of the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 
CATALOGUE OF THE FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW 28 (2008-09). 
 15 Neil S. Siegel, Some Modest Uses of Transnational Legal Perspectives in First-Year Con-
stitutional Law, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 201, 201 (2006) (“Selectivity and modesty are warranted.”). 
 16 Mark Tushnet, How (and How Not) to Use Comparative Constitutional Law in Basic 
Constitutional Law Courses, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 671, 674 (2005).  
 17 David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652, 661 (2005) quoting 
Stephen Breyer, The Supreme Court and the New International Law (ASIL Annual Meeting 
Apr. 4, 2003). 
 18 E.g., GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Vikram David Amar & Mark 
V. Tushnet eds., 2009); MICHAEL LOUIS CORRADO, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS (2005); NORMAN DORSEN et al., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
CASES AND MATERIALS (2003); VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2006); DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2002); BRIAN LANDSBERG & 
LESLIE JACOBS, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2007); 
FRANCOIS VENTER, CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON: JAPAN, GERMANY, CANADA & SOUTH 
AFRICA AS CONSTITUTIONAL STATES (2000).  There are numerous recent books that can be 
mined for interesting teaching materials for a beginning student.  A good example is the Hart 
Publishing Company’s series on “Constitutions of the World”; each volume deals with a differ-
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tional Law.”19  Each is a self-contained unit consisting of a brief intro-
duction, some general discussion questions, links to assigned readings, 
and a list of recommended further readings.20  In the manner of a bri-
coleur,21 I assembled the readings for the Lessons, other background 
materials including video recordings of relevant programs and lec-
tures, and links to relevant documents and accompanying sites for my 
students to access on the user-friendly West Educational Network 
(“TWEN”).22  My Lessons are admittedly derivative of the work of 
others.  I will only briefly describe them here; the interested reader 
can examine the actual Lessons reproduced in the Appendix to this 
article. 
Lesson I: Judicial Review. After covering the introductory chap-
ter with the traditional cases on the power of judicial review and its 
limitations, students first read a traditional descriptive account of how 
judicial review spread throughout the world, especially in the second 
                                                                                                                           
ent country and each author is an expert in the field.  Hart Publishing: Constitutional Systems of 
the World, http://www.hartpub.co.uk/books/series.asp?sc=Constitutional+Systems+of+the+ 
World&st=Constitutional+Systems+of+the+World (last visited Apr. 13, 2011).  
 19 See Philipp Kiiver & Mariolina Eliantonio (Maastricht University, The Netherlands), 
Teaching Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodological Challenges, International Associa-
tion of Law Schools Conference on Constitutional Law, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 11-14, 2009), 
http://www.ialsnet.org/meetings/constit/papers/Eliantonio&Kiiver(thenetherlands).pdf (evaluat-
ing the two competing approaches of teaching comparative constitutional law on a country-by-
country basis versus a comparison subject-by-subject basis). 
 20 Of course, during the semester I also make numerous interspersed references and com-
ments to comparative constitutional law that are brief and specific, often of a current-event 
nature.  See Mark S. Kende (Drake University, U.S.A.), Teaching Comparative Perspectives in 
the Domestic Constitutional Law Class: a Step by Step Primer, International Association of Law 
Schools Conference on Constitutional Law, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 11-14, 2009), 
http://www.ialsnet.org/meetings/constit/papers/KendeMark(USA).pdf. 
 21  The process I call bricolage is perhaps the method least familiar to U.S. constitutional 
scholars.  Describing a people she studied who annoyingly seemed to appropriate elements of its 
culture from anything at hand, Margaret Mead wrote, “A picture of a local native reading the 
index to the Golden Bough just to see if they had missed anything, would be appropriate.”  
Claude Levi-Strauss called this sort of activity bricolage, the assembly of something new from 
whatever materials the constructor discovered.  Contemporary references to comparative consti-
tutional materials may be a form of bricolage.  Functionalists and expressivists worry about 
whether appropriating selected portions of other constitutional traditions is sensible, or whether 
the appropriation will “work” in some sense.  The bricoleur does not have these concerns about 
maintaining proper borders among systems.  
Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1229 
(1999) (footnotes omitted). 
 22 E.g., A Conversation on the Relevance of Foreign Law for American Constitutional 
Adjudication with U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, American 
University (Jan. 13, 2005), http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/founders/2005/050113.cfm; Center 
for Comparative Constitutionalism, http://ccc.uchicago.edu/links.html; Comparative Constitu-
tions Project, http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/; Concourts.net — comparative 
constitutional analysis, http://www.concourts.net/; Constitution Finder, http://confinder.rich-
mond.edu/; International Constitutional Law Project, http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/info.html.  
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half of the twentieth century,23 and then they read Ran Hirschl’s criti-
que of that development from the perspective of critical theory.24  Dis-
cussion questions include: What difference has the power of judicial 
review made in the constitutional history of the United States and 
other countries?  What explains a country’s attitudes towards its judi-
cial institutions, i.e., courts, judges and the exercise of judicial review?  
Can other institutions of government besides the judiciary define and 
protect individual rights?  What are the relative institutional advan-
tages and disadvantages of the traditional three branches — Legisla-
tive, Executive, and Judicial — for interpreting the Constitution?  How 
have different countries sought to adjust for the “counter-
majoritarian” difficulty of the doctrine of judicial review? 
Lesson II: Transnational Interpretation.  Law students today are 
familiar with the concept of globalization and how transnational influ-
ences transcend national boundaries and influence matters of culture 
and economics.  Certainly, the popular culture of the United States is 
a significant influence around the world. Indeed, the phenomenon of 
“Americanization” has been derisively dubbed “McWorld.”  Students 
are asked to apply these ideas to constitutional law.  Can it be im-
ported and exported from one country to another or is a particular 
country’s fundamental law unique — exclusive and self-contained to 
that country?  The required readings include an article by now former 
Puisne Justice L’Heureux-Dube of the Supreme Court of Canada, in 
which she criticizes the Rehnquist Court for not engaging in the inter-
national judicial dialogue on comparative constitutional law,25 and a 
case in which the Justices argue over the propriety of importing con-
stitutional law into the United States.26  This Lesson comes after stu-
dents have been exposed to the deep structure of the Constitution, 
i.e., separation of powers and federalism, and after they have carefully 
parsed judicial opinions that self-consciously apply constitutional 
hermeneutics. 
                                                                                                                           
 23 WILLIAM E. NELSON, The Worldwide Spread of Judicial Review, in MARBURY V. 
MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 104-13 (2000). 
 24 Ran Hirschl, Looking Sideways, Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards: Judicial Re-
view vs. Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 415 (2000); see also RAN 
HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004). 
 25 Clair L’Heureux-Dube, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International 
Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L. J. 15 (1998). 
 26 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999); see also Henk Botha (University of Stellenbosch, 
South Africa), Foreign Constitutional Law and the Courts: Reflections from the South, Interna-
tional Association of Law Schools Conference on Constitutional Law, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 
11-14, 2009), http://www.ialsnet.org/ meetings/constit/papers/BothaHenk(SouthAfrica).pdf (“I 
know of no South African constitutional lawyer or commentator who would dispute that foreign 
law can  —  and often does  —  play a legitimate role in constitutional interpretation.”).  
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Lesson III: Affirmative Action.  After completing their study of 
the Equal Protection Clause, students read about “special measures” 
referenced in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination, and the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women.27  In the United States, 
“special measures” are usually called “affirmative action” or “reverse 
discrimination.”  In the European Community, the term is “positive 
action.”  The programs are known in India as “compensatory discrim-
ination.” Students are asked to consider whether these government 
programs are permitted under the various international treaties and 
the domestic constitutional law of the relevant country.  Students are 
expected to respond comparativistically: first from the perspective of 
the United States — based on their course study — and second from the 
different perspective of another country of their choosing based on 
their reading from an extensive list of country-specific articles.28 
Lesson IV: Reproductive Rights.  After we cover fundamental 
rights, including the right to privacy and sexual autonomy,29 students 
read the line of high court cases on abortion from either Canada30 or 
Germany.31  The obvious comparison, of course, is with the line of 
cases in U.S. Reports that includes Griswold,32 Roe,33 and Casey.34  We 
then discuss a hypothetical state Zero Population Growth Act, pat-
                                                                                                                           
 27 See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An 
International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253 (1999); see also Martha I. Mor-
gan, (University of Alabama, U.S.A.), The Roles of International Human Rights Norms in Com-
parative Constitutional Jurisprudence: CEDAW-Based Examples, International Association of 
Law Schools Conference on Constitutional Law, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 11-14, 2009), 
http://www.ialsnet.org/ meetings/constit/papers/MorganMartha(USA).pdf (discussing the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). 
 28 E.g., THE GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE (Beverley Baines & Ruth 
Rubio-Marin eds., 2005) (comparing the constitutions of Australia, Canada, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, France, Germany, India, Israel, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, and the United States); Sym-
posium on Affirmative Action: An International Perspective on a Global Dilemma, 36 CONN. L. 
REV. 649-877 (2004) (articles about the United States, South Africa, India, Brazil, and interna-
tional human rights law). 
 29 See Martha F. Davis (Northeastern University, U.S.A) & Bethany Withers (Harvard 
University, U.S.A), Reproductive Rights in the Legal Academy: A New Role for Transnational 
Law, International Association of Law Schools Conference on Constitutional Law, Washington, 
D.C. (Sept. 11-14, 2009), http://www.ialsnet.org/meetings/constit/papers/DavisMartha(USA).pdf. 
 30 Morgentaler, Smoling & Scott v. The Queen, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.), redacted in 
JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 18, at 74-110.  
 31 JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 18, at 110-40 (redacting the 1975 West German Abor-
tion Decision and the post-unification 1993 decision invalidating the subsequent statute the 
Bundestag enacted in 1990). 
 32 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of marital privacy). 
 33 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy/abortion). 
 34 Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming Roe). 
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terned after China’s “One Child Rule,” which would impose a two-
child limitation on families for the stated purposes of preserving the 
quality of life in the state, slowing increased demand for state gov-
ernment services, and reducing environmental degradation. 
As I remind my students, their study of comparative constitu-
tional law helps them better understand U.S. constitutional law, not 
unlike how reading a concurring opinion or a dissenting opinion helps 
them better understand a majority opinion.  Their engagement with 
the materials during class is gratifying.  Preparation is evident.  Partic-
ipation is animated.  Discussion often goes over the allotted class time 
and typically spills out into the hallway. 
My students’ engagement with the comparative constitutional 
law readings is part of their evaluation in the form of an essay paper, 
worth ten percent of their final course grade.  Having been exposed to 
the ongoing debate among the current Justices of the Supreme Court 
of the United States whether comparative constitutional analysis is an 
appropriate and a legitimate aspect of American judicial review,35 they 
are required to take a side in this debate and write an essay to justify 
their position within the American judicial tradition.  They are ex-
pected to consider and respond to the opposing arguments, as well, in 
a balanced and measured essay with examples.36  Their thoughtful es-
says are further evidence of how they have begun to appreciate a 
comparative constitutional law perspective. 
Thus, by the completion of my introductory course on U.S. con-
stitutional law, my 1L students have begun to understand intuitively 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (Kennedy, J., for the Court; O’Connor, 
J. & Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (Kennedy, J. for the Court; 
Scalia, J., dissenting); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Foster v. Florida, 537 
U.S. 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring; Breyer, J., dissenting); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 
(1999) (Thomas, J., concurring; Breyer, J., dissenting); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 
n.11 & 976 (1997) (Scalia, J., majority; Breyer, J., dissenting); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
815, 830-32 & 869 n.4 (1988) (Stevens, J., for the Court; Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 36 Discussion Questions include: Are constitutional provisions arbitrary political constructs 
that are idiosyncratic to a particular country and a particular era or are there background nor-
mative principles that are universal for all peoples and constant over all time?  How is the consti-
tution of a nation related to more general and fundamental cultural traditions, i.e., does the 
constitution shape the culture or does the culture shape the constitution?  How is your view of 
the proper role of a constitutional court reflected in your analysis?  Does your argument depend 
on the nature and the content of the particular clause, i.e., is comparative analysis more appro-
priate for some clauses than for other clauses?  Does your argument apply transnationally, i.e., 
would you treat comparative constitutional arguments the same whether you were a member of 
the Supreme Court of the United States dealing with the constitutional law of another country 
or whether you were a member of the constitutional court of some other country dealing with 
the constitutional law of the United States?  See generally Christopher A. Whytock, Taking 
Causality Seriously in Comparative Constitutional Law: Insights from Comparative Politics and 
Comparative Political Economy, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629 (2008). 
108 FIU Law Review [6:99 
how “comparative analysis emphatically is relevant to the task of in-
terpreting constitutions and enforcing human rights.”37 That is enough 
for me.38 
                                                                                                                           
 37 Ginsburg & Merritt, supra note 27, at 282; see also R. Randall Kelso South Texas Col-
lege of Law, U.S.A.), Use of International Sources in United States Constitutional Interpretation, 
International Association of Law Schools Conference on Constitutional Law, Washington, D.C. 
(Sept. 11-14, 2009), http://www.ialsnet.org/meetings/constit/papers/KelsoRandall(USA).pdf 
(setting out the various approaches of the Justices); Michel Rosenfeld (Yeshiva University, 
U.S.A), Principle or Ideology? A Comparativist Perspective on the U.S. Controversy Over Su-
preme Court Citations to Foreign Authorities, International Association of Law Schools Confe-
rence on Constitutional Law, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 11-14, 2009, http://www.ialsnet.org/ 
meetings/constit/papers/RosenfeldMichel(USA).pdf (describing the parallel scholarly and juridi-
cal debates from different perspectives and ideologies); David Fontana, The Rise and Fall of 
Comparative Constitutional Law in the Post-War Era, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2010) (charting the 
rise and fall of comparative constitutional law discourse in American legal education). 
 38 I cannot improve on Professor Howard’s curriculum challenge: 
[C]omparative constitutional law has been a growth industry in American law schools. 
Comparativism in constitutional law serves many purposes.  It enriches one's study of 
American constitutional law by adding another dimension to our critique of what the Su-
preme Court does.  It heightens our sense of the world beyond our national boundaries, 
useful to lawyers whose firms and clients operate on the international scene, but also to 
lawyers as world citizens.  Comparative studies can also nourish our search for principles of 
ordered liberty and for theories of a just society. 
  Will comparative constitutional law contribute to the growth of American constitutional 
law?  We watch with fascination as justices of the Supreme Court debate whether compara-
tive data are legitimate and relevant in defining such concepts of due process of law and 
cruel and unusual punishment . . . . What will tomorrow’s justices do?  That may depend in 
part on what is taught in today’s law school classrooms. 
A.E. Dick Howard (University of Virginia, U.S.A.), The Renaissance of Comparative Constitu-
tionalism, International Association of Law Schools Conference on Constitutional Law, Wash-
ington, D.C. (Sept. 11-14, 2009), http://www.ialsnet.org/meetings/constit/papers/Howard 
DiCKAE(USA).pdf; see also M.N.S. Sellers (University of Baltimore, U.S.A.), Comparative 
Constitutional Law: A Window into the Fundamental Requirements of a Just Legal Order, Inter-
national Association of Law Schools Conference on Constitutional Law, Washington, D.C. 
(Sept. 11-14, 2009), http://www.ialsnet.org/meetings/constit/papers/SellersMortimer(USA).pdf 
(“The proper purpose of constitutionalism has been, from the beginning, to advance the com-
mon good through law. . . . The value of comparative constitutional law arises . . . from compar-
ing the efficacy with which the many various constitutional orders in the world realize and ad-
vance a just legal order, in the very different political, cultural, regional, historical and other 
circumstances in which they find themselves.”). 
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 APPENDIX 
LESSON I: JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Chapter 1. Judicial Review 
§ 1 — 2. Limitations on the Exercise of Judicial 
       Review at 70:  
Like rock-and-roll, judicial review is here to stay, with all due re-
spect to Justice Scalia, who declined to comment on Marbury v. Madi-
son, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), during his Senate confirmation 
hearing, because he said the issue might come before the Supreme 
Court. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997).  However, a noteworthy 
development in the 1990s was the hard core critique against the Su-
preme Court’s power and performance.  Robert Bork, the Reagan 
nominee who was not confirmed to the Supreme Court and one of the 
most conservative constitutionalists on the right, and Georgetown 
University’s Mark Tushnet, one of the most liberal constitutionalists 
on the left, both published book-length arguments against judicial 
review.  ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: 
MODERN LIBERALISM AND THE AMERICAN DECLINE (1996); MARK 
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
(1999).  Bork would allow the Supreme Court to continue to decide 
constitutional cases but would amend the Constitution to authorize 
Congress to overrule an interpretation of the Constitution by a simple 
majority vote.  Tushnet would go farther to eliminate judicial review 
in the courts by a constitutional amendment, leaving the task of con-
stitutional interpretation to Congress and populist politics.  These 
prominent heretics, and numerous other scholars and commentators 
who have joined in the intellectual fray, demonstrate how the dogma 
of judicial review still remains controversial in the United States.  But 
consider judicial review within a comparative constitutional law pers-
pective. 
Required Readings: 
(1) WILLIAM E. NELSON, The Worldwide Spread of Judicial Re-
view, in MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 104-13 (2000) (TWEN file). 
(2) Ran Hirschl, Looking Sideways, Looking Backwards, Look-
ing Forwards: Judicial Review vs. Democracy in Comparative Perspec-
tive, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 415 (2000) (TWEN file). 
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Discussion Questions: 
• Review the questions in the casebook at page 11-14, particular-
ly question 4 at 12-13. 
• What difference has the power of judicial review made in the 
constitutional history of the United States and other countries?  What 
are its costs and benefits? 
• What explains a country’s attitudes towards its judicial institu-
tions, i.e., courts, judges, and the exercise of judicial review? 
• Are there viable alternatives to the legalization or constitutio-
nalization of rights?  Can other institutions of government besides the 
judiciary define and protect individual rights?  What are the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of the traditional three branches — Leg-
islative, Executive, and Judicial — for interpreting the Constitution? 
• How have other countries sought to adjust for the “counter-
majoritarian” difficulty of the doctrine of judicial review, i.e., the in-
herent tension between rigid constitutionalism and judicial policymak-
ing, on the one hand, and fundamental democratic values of political 
participation and representation, on the other? 
Further Readings: 
Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Conse-
quences of the New Constitutionalism (2004). 
HERBERT JACOB, ED., COURTS, LAW, AND POLITICS IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1996) (chapter-length discussions of 
the United States, England, France, Germany, and Japan). 
EDWARD MCWHINNEY, SUPREME COURTS AND JUDICIAL 
LAW-MAKING: CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNALS AND CONSTITUTION-
AL REVIEW (1986) (compares judicial review in the United States, 
Canada, India, Germany, France, and Japan). 
BARRY STURGESS & PHILIP CHUBB, JUDGING THE WORLD: 
LAW AND POLITICS IN THE WORLD’S LEADING COURTS (1988) (ex-
amines the highest courts of Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, 
Canada, India, Ireland, United States, West Germany, plus the World 
Court and some other supranational judicial institutions). 
Symposium: Judicial Review in the Americas . . . and Beyond, 45 
DUQUESNE L. REV. 361 (2007) (interdisciplinary perspectives; partic-
ular comparative analysis of Argentina, Canada, Costa Rica, Mexico, 
Peru, and Venezuela). 
Symposium: Comparative Avenues in Constitutional Law, 82 TEX. 
L. REV. 1653 (2004) (comparing constitutional structures and institu-
tional designs; borrowing among regimes; and constitutional courts in 
the field of power politics).  
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Mauro Capppelletti, The “Mighty Problem” of Judicial Review 
and the Contribution of Comparative Analysis, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 409 
(1980) (comparative analysis indicates opposing trend lines: European 
legal systems are moving towards greater roles for courts and judges 
at the same time that many in the United States are questioning the 
fundamental idea of judicial review).  
David Deener, Judicial Review in Modern Constitutional Systems, 
46 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1079 (1952) (traces the historical acceptance of 
judicial review as a means for guarding against legislative encroach-
ments on the constitution). 
Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism, 
11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 71 (2004) (assesses the theories of 
transformation that purport to explain the globalization of judicial 
review and individual rights entrenchment). 
Symposium, Judicial Review in Latin America, 7 SW. J. L. & 
TRADE AM. 227 (2000) (articles on judicial review in Argentina, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, and Mexico). 
Michael Troper, The Logic of Justification of Judicial Review, 1 
INT’L J. CONST. L. 99 (2003) (explores the fundamental contradictions 
of judicial review). 
Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. 
L. REV. 2781 (2003) (compares strong and weak versions of judicial 
review). 
LESSON II: TRANSNATIONAL INTERPRETATION 
Chapter 5. The Foreign Affairs Power 
§ 5 — 2. Treaties and Executive Agreements at 350:  
In order to interpret the Constitution, even an originalist must 
find guidance in another time and place.  The framers self-consciously 
and forthrightly borrowed greatly from the constitutional thought of 
other countries.  They were conversant with Aristotle, Cicero, Mon-
tesquieu, and Locke, for examples.  Yet, the leading proponent of 
originalism on the High Court today insists “comparative analysis [is] 
inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution.” Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
There is much talk today in the popular press about “globalization” 
and “transnational” influences, which transcend national boundaries 
and influence matters of culture and economics.  Certainly, the popu-
lar culture of the United States is a major influence around the world.  
Indeed, the process of Americanization has been derisively dubbed 
“McWorld.”  But what about constitutional law?  Can it be imported 
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and exported from one country to another or is a particular country’s 
fundamental law unique — exclusive and self-contained to that coun-
try?  What are the sources of constitutional law, i.e., when we refer to 
the Constitution to what are we referring?  Only the four corners of 
the text?  History and tradition?  What about transnational legal doc-
uments, like the United Nation’s Declaration of Human Rights?  How 
does your answer fit into our study of the treaty power? 
Required Readings: 
(1) Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999). 
(2) Clair L’Heureux-Dube, The Importance of Dialogue: Globa-
lization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA 
L. J. 15 (1998) (34 TLSLJ 15). 
Discussion Questions: 
• What, if any, are the economic assumptions underlying the 
Constitution of the United States?  What, if any, are its underlying 
socio-political assumptions?  Temporally, how can it be that an eigh-
teenth century document is still operative in the twenty-first century? 
• Assuming that the Constitution functions satisfactorily and ef-
fectively in the United States, would it function the same way if it 
were adopted by another country?  Are there some provisions of the 
Constitution that are idiosyncratic to the United States and others 
that are universal? 
• Who makes the better argument — Justice Thomas concurring 
or Justice Breyer dissenting in the denial of the writ of certiorari in 
Knight v. Florida — on the issue whether the jurisprudence of other 
countries should inform how the Supreme Court would decide the 
issue whether a defendant can take advantage of appellate and colla-
teral procedures and then complain about the resulting delay of his 
execution? 
• According to Clair L’Heureux-Dube, Puisne Justice of the Su-
preme Court of Canada, how do courts in different countries consider 
each others’ judgments and what has been the role of the Rehnquist 
Court within what she calls the “new global judicial community?” 
• Following Western political philosophy, the United States dis-
tinguishes political entitlements we call civil rights and civil liberties 
that are protected by the Constitution proper from other entitlements 
to government benefits that are provided by the state.  Thus, there is a 
right to free speech but there is only a statutory entitlement to public 
assistance or welfare.  Are these categories separate and distinct?  
What does this distinction say about the Constitution and the social 
traditions of the United States?  Furthermore, for some fundamental 
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rights, like the right to counsel, the state has a duty to subsidize the 
right if a person is indigent, but for other fundamental rights, like the 
right of privacy that figures in a woman’s autonomy to terminate her 
pregnancy, the state does not have a duty to subsidize the right, even 
if the abortion is necessary to protect the health and life of the wom-
an.  Do these distinctions make sense in the context of background 
normative principles in constitutional law?  
Further Readings: 
Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Com-
parativism, 52 UCLA L. REV. 639 (2005) (presents four classical con-
stitutional theories — originalism, natural law, majoritarianism, and 
pragmatism — and addresses the propriety of comparativism under 
each theory). 
Robert S. Barker, Constitutionalism in the Americas: A Bicenten-
nial Perspective, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 891 (1988) (emphasizes the Con-
stitution as an inter-American document that has influenced most 
Latin American constitutions). 
William J. Brennan, The Worldwide Influence of the United States 
Constitution as a Charter of Human Rights, 15 NOVA L. REV. 1 (1991) 
(discusses the influence of the Constitution and American judicial 
review on the constitutional law of other countries). 
Pat K. Chew, The Rule of Law: China’s Skepticism and the Rule 
of People, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 43 (2005) (explores alterna-
tive cultural assumptions about the rule of law in the theoretical de-
bate between legal formalism and cultural norms). 
Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward 
a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L. J. 
819 (1999) (describes how comparative constitutional law has as-
sumed a central role in constitutional law around the world). 
David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 539 (2001) (argues that a moderate, workable practice 
of using comparative constitutional law is consistent with both the 
original understanding of the Constitution and the historical practice 
of the Supreme Court). 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value 
of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 
IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2003) (discusses “why we should both lead and 
learn from others” regarding judicial review for constitutionality). 
Mary Ann Glendon, The Forgotten Crucible: The Latin American 
Influence on the Universal Human Rights Idea, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. 
J. 27 (2003) (explores the role and influence of Latin American mod-
els on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). 
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Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-Model: The United States Constitu-
tion and the “Rise of World Constitutionalism”, 2000 WISC. L. REV. 
597 (discusses and evaluates the place of the United States Constitu-
tion in the context of the globalization of constitutionalism). 
Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a “Wider 
Civilization”: Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court’s Use of Foreign and 
International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO 
ST. L. J. 1283 (2004) (explores the various ways justices on the Rehn-
quist Court have used foreign and international law to interpret the 
U.S. Constitution). 
David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652 
(2005) (explores why judges in different countries are increasingly 
applying somewhat similar constitutional doctrines and reasoning in 
somewhat similar circumstances and whether academics and judges 
should embrace or resist this development of a “generic constitutional 
law”). 
Richard B. Lillich, The United States Constitution and Interna-
tional Human Rights Law, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. 53 (1990) (describes 
how the United States has contributed significantly to the develop-
ment of international human rights but criticizes the Supreme Court 
for making little use of international human rights documents either 
directly or in interpreting the Constitution). 
ROBERT L. MADDEX, THE ILLUSTRATED DICTIONARY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTS (1996) (international and comparativist 
reference for constitutional terms and concepts). 
Cody Moon, Comparative Constitutional Analysis: Should the 
United States Supreme Court Join the Dialogue?, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 229 (2003) (proposes that the Supreme Court adopt a selective 
practice of comparative constitutional analysis). 
Matthew S. Raalf, Note, A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: Why the 
Debate Surrounding Comparative Constitutional Law is Spectacularly 
Ordinary, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1239 (2004) (seeks to reconceptual-
ize the debate in terms of the underlying constitutional theories). 
John C. Reitz, How to Do Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 
617 (1998) (describes a “comparative method” and identifies the most 
important characteristics of good comparative scholarship). 
Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Migration and the Bounds of 
Comparative Analysis, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 67 (2001) (ar-
gues that comparative constitutional analysis has become necessary 
and unavoidable given the migration of constitutional ideas and the 
transplantation of constitutional norms across national boundaries). 
Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional 
Law, 108 YALE L. J. 1225 (1999) (offers a systematic approach to the 
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possibility of learning from the constitutional experience of other 
countries in the process of interpreting the Constitution). 
Symposium, Constitutional Borrowing, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 181 
(2003) (various scholars from various countries examine the pheno-
menon of “borrowing” — comparative constitutional law). 
Symposium: Contextuality & Universality: Constitutional Borrow-
ing on the Global Stage, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 173 (1998) (various 
scholars explore the practice of borrowing and its implications for 
constitutionalism). 
LESSON III: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
Chapter 8. Equal Protection 
§ 8 — 2. Suspect Classes and Other Classifications 
       at 789: 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) 
is a fundamental human rights treaty that was adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in 1966 and was ratified by the Unit-
ed States in 1992.  International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, http://www2.ohchr.org/ 
english/law/ccpr.htm.  Article 2 contains a general norm against any 
state discrimination based on “race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status” in regard to the rights recognized in the Covenant.  Id. 
art. 2.  Article 26 specifically provides for an international right to the 
equal protection of the laws: 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law.  In this respect, 
the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all 
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on 
any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, nation or social origin, property, birth or other 
status. 
Id. art. 26. 
A second important treaty, the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) was 
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1965 and 
was ratified by the United States in 1994.  International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 
1966, 660 U.N.T.S.195, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm.  
In Article I “racial discrimination” is defined as 
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any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on 
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the 
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, en-
joyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural 
or any other field of public life. 
Id. art. 1(1).  
Article I goes on to authorize and allow for “special measures:” 
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate 
advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individual re-
quiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure 
such groups or individuals equal enjoyment of exercise of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial dis-
crimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a 
consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for dif-
ferent racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the 
objectives for which they were taken have been achieved. 
Id. art. 1(4). 
A third important treaty, the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was adopted 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1979 and was rati-
fied by the United States in 1980.  Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 
U.N.T.S. 13, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cedaw.htm.  In Article 
1, “discrimination against women” is defined as  
distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex 
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of 
their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, eco-
nomic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. 
Id. art. 1.   
Article 2 generally condemns discrimination against women “in 
all its forms,” Id. art. 2, however, Article 4 specifically provides: 
Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed 
at accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall 
not be considered discrimination as defined in this Convention, 
but shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of 
unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be discon-
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tinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treat-
ment have been achieved. 
Id. art. 4. 
Signatory states must reconcile these international agreements 
with the constitutional law of their country and their domestic poli-
cies.  For example, read these treaties side-by-side with the Four-
teenth Amendment and the U.S. Supreme Court decisions on the sub-
ject of affirmative action for race and gender. 
Discussion Question: 
• In the United States, “special measures” are usually called “af-
firmative action” or “reverse discrimination.”  In the European 
Community, the term is “positive action.”  The programs are known 
in India as “compensatory discrimination.”  But no matter what one 
labels these governmental programs, the question of international law 
is whether the programs are permitted under the UN treaties and the 
domestic constitutional law of the relevant country.  Answer this 
question from the two different comparative constitutional law pers-
pectives: first from the perspective of the United States — based on our 
study of affirmative action — and second from the different perspec-
tive of one of the following: Canada, China, the European Communi-
ty, Germany, India, or South Africa.  Choose your second perspective 
and then read at least one applicable article from the following list to 
help you answer the second part of the question: 
M. Varn Chandola, Affirmative Action in India and the United 
States: The Untouchable and Black Experience, 3 IND. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 101 (1992) (India and castes). 
Adil Hassim, Affirmative Action Policies in the United States and 
South Africa: A Comparative Study, 2000 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW 
TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 119 (South Africa and race). 
Barry Sautman, Affirmative Action, Ethnic Minorities and Chi-
na’s Universities, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 77 (1998) (China and eth-
nicity). 
Jason Morgan-Foster, Note, From Hutchins Hall to Hyderbad 
and Beyond: A Comparative Look at Affirmative Action in Three Ju-
risdictions, 9 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L. J. 73 (2003) 
(race/United States and gender/Europe and caste-India). 
Christopher D. Totten, Constitutional Precommitments to Gender 
Affirmative Action in the European Union, Germany, Canada and the 
United States: A Comparative Approach, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 27 
(2003) (United States, Canada, Germany, and European Union and 
gender). 
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Ac-
tion: An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 
253 (1999) (seeks to reconcile and legitimate affirmative action with 
the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights). 
Further readings: 
THE GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE (Beverley 
Baines & Ruth Rubio-Marin, eds., 2005) (comparing the constitutions 
of Australia, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, France, Germany, India, 
Israel, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, and the United States). 
Symposium on Affirmative Action: An International Perspective 
on a Global Dilemma, 36 CONN. L. REV. 649 (2004) (articles about 
the United States, South Africa, India, Brazil, and international hu-
man rights law). 
Danielle Caruso, Limits of the Classic Method: Positive Action in 
the European Union After the New Equality Directives, 44 HARV. 
INT’L L. J. 331 (2003) (considers the issues within the broader context 
of the evolution of European constitutionalism). 
Rebecca L. Case, Note, Not Separate But Not Equal: How Should 
the United States Address Its International Obligations to Eradicate 
Racial Discrimination in the Public Education System?, 21 PENN. ST. 
INT’L L. REV. 205 (2002) (analyzes how treaties and conventions 
might be applied to public schools). 
Tanya Katerí Hernández, Multicultural Matrix: the Role of Race 
Ideology in the Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Laws, a United 
States — Latin America Comparison, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1093 (2002) 
(examines the role and function of race ideology in the enforcement 
of antidiscrimination laws in the United States and Latin America and 
argues for a more global focus). 
F. Michael Higginbotham, Affirmative Action in the United States 
and South Africa: Lessons from the Other Side, 13 TEMP. INT’L COMP. 
L.J. 187 (1999) (South Africa and race). 
James P. Sterba, Completing Thomas Sowell’s Study on Affirma-
tive Action and Then Drawing Different Conclusions, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 657 (2004) (reviewing THOMAS SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION AROUND THE WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY (2004)). 
Thomas Trelogan, Steve Mazurana & Paul Hodapp, Can’t We 
Enlarge the Blanket and the Bed?: A Comparative Analysis of Posi-
tive/Affirmative Action in the European Court of Justice and the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court, 28 HASTINGS INT’L COMP. L. REV. 39 (2004) 
(comparing the arguments and analysis of European positive action 
and American affirmative action for women). 
Sean Pager, Strictness and Subsidiarity: An Institutional Perspec-
tive on Affirmative Action at the European Court of Justice, 26 B.C. 
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INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 35 (2003) (describes how the ECJ has taken 
an “American approach” to affirmative action that is out of keeping 
with its supranational role and contrary to the principle of judicial 
subsidiarity towards the national judiciaries of member states). 
Sean Pager, Equality and the European Union, 32 GA. J. INT’L 
COMP. L. 73 (2004) (examines the new comprehensive initiatives of 
the EU regarding human rights and anti-discrimination). 
Jordan J. Paust, Race-based Affirmative Action and International 
Law, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 659 (1997) (discusses the international law, 
treaty-based acceptability of affirmative action programs). 
Robert Perkovich & Reena Saini, Women’s Rights in Cuba: “Mas 
O Menos,” 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 399 (2002) (explores gender 
equality issues from the perspectives of politics, ideology, and cul-
ture). 
Carol Daugherty Rasnic, The U.S. Supreme Court on Affirmative 
Action: Are Some of Us “More Equal” than Others! (With Some 
Comparisons to Post-Good Friday Agreement Police Hiring in North-
ern Ireland), 7 SCHOLAR 23 (2004) (compares the most recent Su-
preme Court cases in higher education to provision in the Agreement 
that police be hired 50% Catholic and 50% Protestant). 
Compare Brad R. Roth, The CEDAW as a Collective Approach 
to Women’s Rights, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 187 (2002), with Rhonda E. 
Howard-Hassman, (Dis)Embedded Women, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 227 
(2002) (debating which international legal approach more effectively 
protects women’s rights, the collective or the individual). 
Kendall Thomas, The Political Economy of Recognition: Affirma-
tive Action Discourse and Constitutional Equality in Germany and the 
U.S.A., 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 329 (1999) (Germany and gender). 
Todd Joseph Koback, Note, The Long, Hard Road to Amster-
dam: Effects of Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen and the Treaty of 
Amsterdam on Positive Action and Gender Equality in European 
Community Law, 17 WISC. INT’L L.J. 463 (1999) (European Commu-
nity and gender). 
LESSON IV: REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 
Chapter 8. Equal Protection 
§ 8 — 3. Fundamental Rights at 943: 
Prominent American constitutionalists have debated the value of 
comparative constitutional law in the area of reproductive rights, 
among them two Harvard professors: Mary Ann Glendon and Lau-
rence H. Tribe.  Compare MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND 
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DIVORCE LAW IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN FAILURES, 
EUROPEAN CHALLENGES (1989), with LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1992).  Professor Glendon 
argues in favor of the European approach, which she describes as 
more communitarian and more nuanced to take into account both 
sides of the issue, what we call the “Pro-life” side and the “Pro-
choice” side.  She criticizes the fact that abortion policy in the United 
States was not worked out in the legislative process but rather was 
decreed by the Supreme Court in a series of decisions that not only 
rendered existing state statutes unconstitutional but also severely li-
mited the scope of any subsequent state regulations.  She believes 
that, if the states had been left alone to legislate, most legislatures 
would have followed the trend in the decade before the Supreme 
Court constitutionalized the subject and their statutes would resemble 
most European statutes which permit abortions but require medical 
findings and counseling.  Professor Tribe disagrees to criticize the Eu-
ropean statutes as amounting to either an empty promise for the “Pro-
choice” side or a false promise for the “Pro-life” side.  He insists that 
the European approach of different countries taking different ap-
proaches to abortion should not be allowed among the fifty states be-
cause it would compromise the American norm of equality and un-
dermine the entire enterprise of defining and protecting individual 
rights.  Thus, the abortion issue and reproductive rights more general-
ly are as contested an area of comparative constitutional law as they 
are for constitutional law within the United States. 
Required Reading (read one of these two selections in the excerpt 
from the VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1st ed. 1999)) (multiple pdf files are on the 
Westlaw TWEN page): 
Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott v. The Queen, 1 S.C.R. 30 (Su-
preme Court of Canada 1988) (JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra, at 
77-113),  
or   
The Sequence of Abortion Decisions by the German Courts (West 
German Federal Constitutional Court 1975 & German Constitu-
tional Court 1993) (JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra, at 115-40). 
Discussion questions: 
• Can you distinguish between matters of public policy that be-
long in the legislative branch and other matters of constitutional law 
that belong in the judicial branch?  Does the Constitution provide 
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clear distinctions between them?  Is there a dividing line between law 
and politics?  
• Based on your reading, analyze and compare the constitutional 
law of either Canada or Germany with what you learned about the 
constitutional law of the United States on the subject of abortion. 
• Hypothetical: suppose a state passes a Zero Population Growth 
Act, patterned after China’s “One Child Rule,” which imposes a two-
child limitation on everyone, i.e., every person can have only two bio-
logical children.  The legislature’s stated purposes are to preserve the 
general quality of life in the state, to reduce the increase in demand 
for state government services, and to reduce environmental degrada-
tion.  A one-time fine or “tax” of $1000 will be imposed on anyone for 
every child over the limit.  This is a lifetime limitation that applies no 
matter how often a person is married and whether or not the child 
survives.  Would the measure be constitutional?  What is the proper 
constitutional analysis?  Would your conclusion vary from the United 
States to Canada to Germany? 
Further Readings: 
Diana D.M. Babor, Population Growth and Reproductive Rights 
in International Human Rights Law, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 83 (1999). 
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Lessons for the United States in the Wake of Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 537 (1990). 
Sarah Davis, Note, United States, Germany, and South Africa: 
Constitutional and Judicial Decisions on Abortion — Testing Judicial 
Globalization, 16 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L. J. 170 (2002). 
Deborah Goldberg, Developments in German Abortion Law: A 
U.S. Perspective, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. 531 (1995). 
Berta E. Hernandez, To Bear or Not to Bear: Reproductive Free-
dom as an International Human Right, 17 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 309 
(1991). 
Crene T. Kendrick, Note, The Illegality of Abortion in Mexico, 39 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 125 (2003). 
Richard E. Levy & Alexander Somek, Paradoxical Parallels in 
the American and German Abortion Decisions, 9 TUL. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 109 (2001). 
Maureen C. McBrien, Ireland: Balancing Traditional Domestic 
Abortion Law With Modern Reality and International Influence, 26 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 195 (2002). 
Gerald L. Neuman, Casey in the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse, and the 
Right to Protections in the United States and Germany, 43 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 273 (1995). 
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Charles Stanley Ross, The Right of Privacy and Restraints on 
Abortion Under the “Undue Burden” Test: A Jurisprudential Compar-
ison of Planned Parenthood v. Casey with European Practice and Ital-
ian Law, 3 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 199 (1993). 
Richard Stith, New Constitutional and Penal Theory in Spanish 
Abortion Law, 35 J. AM. J. COMP. L. 513 (1987). 
Katarina Tomasevski, European Approaches to Enhancing Re-
productive Freedom, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1037 (1995). 
For FindLaw’s links to various on-line documents from the 
People’s Republic of China, including the constitution and the 1979 
Tian An Men Square Declaration of Human Rights, see generally 
http://www.findlaw.com/12international/countries/cn.html.  
The BBC has posted links to the abortion policies of member 
states of the European Union: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ 
europe/1869009.stm. 
 
